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MEMORANDUM OF TRANSMITTAL 
To: Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman; and Senator Alan K. 
Simpson, Ranking Minority Member. 
From: Members of Subcommittee Study Mission: Jerry M. Tinker, 
Staff Director; Michael Myers, Counsel; Richard W. Day, Mi-
nority Counsel; and Gregory Craig, Foreign Policy Advisor to 
Senator Kennedy. 
The attached report reflects our findings and recommendations 
based upon a week-long study mission to the field in early April 
1988 to assess the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan. During 
our stay in Pakistan we conferred with senior officials of the Paki-
stan Government, with international arid voluntary agencies, and 
with the U.S. Ambassador and his senior staff. We visited refugee 
villages along the Afghan-Pakistan border in the Peshawar region 
and in Quetta, and had extensive conversations with those officials 
working directly with refugees both in Pakistan as well as in the 
cross-border operation into Afghanistan. We also met with repre-
sentatives of the Afghan resistance. 
In addition to official briefings here in Washington, we returned 
through Geneva to consult with U.S. negotiators and the Pakistan 
Foreign Minister on the terms of the Geneva accord and the modal-
ities for its implementation. 
In light of developments in the field, and particularly in Geneva 
with the signing of the accord, , the Afghan refugee situation has 
clearly reached a major crossroad, presenting new problems and 
some extraordinary new challenges to the international communi-
ty-in particular to the four signatory parties to the accords and 
their associates in the field. 
This report is a "snap shot" assessment of current issues and de-
velopments in what is admittedly a rapidly changing situation. We 
have attempted to report the perspective from the field, as well as 
outline some options, contingency plans, and new programs that 
will likely be required to deal with the changing Afghan refugee 
situation-particularly in anticipation of a major repatriation 
effort funded by the international community over the coming 
year. 
· The following reflects our views and findings. However, we were 
assisted by Timothy Lenderking in the preparation of background 
research and analysis. Mr. Lenderking served as a subcommittee 
intern following work with voluntary agency programs in Pakistan 




BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN 
For 9 long years, the world's largest refugee population has lived 
with the hope that one day they might be able to return to their 
war-ravaged country. Beginning in 1979 when the Soviet Union 
sent armies of invasion and occupation into neighboring Afghani-
stan, 5 million Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran to escape the in-
vading Soviet troops and the brutal repression that followed. 
Today, there is the prospect that these long years of suffering 
and conflict may finally be drawing to a close. But many obstacles 
and challenges remain to be met and overcome before peace will 
return to Afghanistan. 
This report outlines the origins of the conflict and describes the 
Soviet invasion, the developing refugee crisis and, thanks to a polit-
ical and diplomatic breakthrough, the prospects for the repatri-
ation of the refugees and a political settlement in Afghanistan. It 
also relates the extraordinary suffering the Afghan people have ex-
perienced as well as the generous outpouring of international relief 
and assistance to help millions of men, women and children in 
need. 
The international program of humanitarian assistance has al-
lowed millions of Afghans to escape and to live in relative safety, 
but the key to the end of this crisis has been the courage and deter-
mination of the Afghan freedom fighters who have fought so val-
iantly to resist Soviet occupation. Against all odds and with limited 
outside support, they carried on the struggle. And now, because of 
that resistance, the Soviets have been persuaded that their troops 
must finally leave Afghanistan to the Afghan people. 
That decision came in the context of long and patient negotia-
tions led by United Nations mediator, Diego Cordovez. His persist-
ent intervention, at the direction of the U.N. Secretary General 
and in response to repeated resolutions from the General Assem-
bly, set the stage for the signing of the Geneva accords on April 14, 
1988. This historic document establishes a framework that will 
allow the people of Afghanistan the chance to work for peace and 
stability and self-determination. This agreement will not end the 
fighting, but it will surely hasten the day when millions of Afghan 
refugees will be able to return to their homes and lands. 
In addition to the heroism of the Afghans themselves and the pa-
tient persistence of U.N. mediator Cordovez, another factor that 
contributed to the Soviets' decision was the sustained, bipartisan 
support for the policy initiated by President Carter and continued 
by President Reagan to provide assistance to the Afghan people 
and their efforts to resist Soviet occupation. 
(V ) 
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The tasks that remain are great, and good will alone will not be 
enough. Serious political and humanitarian issues must still be re-
solved, requiring continued determination and generosity. Without 
that, there is little chance that the refugees will be able to return, 
or that a genuine peace will replace years of conflict in the coun-
tryside. 
At this crucial stage, we and others involved in the peace process 
must be vigilant against those who would undermine the Geneva 
accords or otherwise continue the conflict. In particular, the 
United States must-
-continue to provide support to the international agencies 
involved in the refugee effort; 
-support scrupulous implementation and verification of the 
Geneva accords; 
-use whatever leverage the United States has at its disposal 
to support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to es-
tablish an interim government in Afghanistan; and 
-within the context of the accords, maintain existing levels 
of assistance for the Afghan people who seek to return to their 
country and rebuild their nation. 
If these four challenges can be met, even minimally, then peace 
and some stability may again return to Afghanistan and the long 
suffering of its people will come to an end. 
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I. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. POLICY ISSUES 
(a) The aims of U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should be the fol-
lowing: 
-The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from all 
of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military 
threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf; 
-A political resolution of the differences between the vari-
ous Afghani factions-including the PDPA-that will end the 
fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate national 
government in Kabul; and 
-The return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to 
Afghanistan. 
(b) To achieve these objectives, the United States should: 
-Support implementation and verification of the accords; 
-Support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez to es-
tablish an interim government in Afghanistan; 
-Continue to support those international agencies, such as 
the UNHCR and the ICRC, that will be involved with the repa-
triation of the Afghan refugees; and 
- In this connection, the United States should resist all 
temptations to recognize a provisional government in the 
weeks ahead, for it would be a sure-fire formula for a protract-
ed civil war. We must allow the U.N. peace process to work, 
and to take no action that could be perceived as undermining 
the Geneva accords. 
(c) U.S. policy should retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate 
any of the possible outcomes in Afghanistan.-The U.S. should sup-
port continued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at exist-
ing levels, while understanding that whatever influence and lever-
age the United States can exercise with the Afghans is, at best, ex-
tremely limited. For that reason, the United States should take 
care that it not become identified with one Afghan faction over the 
others. 
(d) The way in which the United States distributes its assistance -
to the Afghans in the future-which Afghans receive it and from 
whom-is a problem that deserves serious attention.-It may well 
be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our cross-border AID oper-
ation so that other nations-e.g., Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China-
are also involved in this effort. 
2. REFUGEE AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES 
(a) The Afghan refugee program in Pakistan is a model for pro-
grams in other parts of the world.-The government of Pakistan 
has ably shouldered the burden of hosting 3 million refugees, and 
(1) 
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has been generously assisted by governments, the U.N. High Com-
missioner for Refugees, and voluntary agencies: 
(b) The repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is unlikely to be 
sudden, and probably will not begin in large numbers until this 
autumn or the spring of 1989.-Most refugees and relief workers 
interviewed suggest that refugees will await the departure of 
Soviet forces-and possibly even the collapse of the current Kabul 
regime-before returning to Afghanistan. 
(c) The relief organizations currently working in Pakistan, or in 
the cross-border operation, are competently staffed and well attuned 
to the needs of the refugees.-These organizations' programs can 
easily be transformed from relief to repatriation. However, the ob-
stacles to the establishment of a repatriation resettlement and re-
habilitation infrastructure within Afghanistan are extraordinarily 
serious. 
(d) Afghan refugees will likely return based upon a realistic as-
sessment of their prospects of survival, and many families will be 
able to reintegrate successfully on their own without massive assist-
ance. -Many refugee families have frequently returned to Afghani-
stan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home villages. As a 
result, many know the extent of damage to their property, and the 
effort that will be required to recultivate their fields and regain 
their livelihoods. 
(e) The international community should rely heavily upon the ex-
pertise already developed in Pakistan to both plan and execute the 
repatriation program.-Refugee officers of the Pakistan govern-
ment and U.N. agencies, as well as voluntary agencies involved 
with the current humanitarian cross_-border operation, already 
have an impressive knowledge of such vital factors as: 
-migration routes into Afghanistan; 
-the places of origin within the country from which the ref-
ugees have migrated; 
-where distribution centers could most productively be lo-
cated within the country; and 
-the extent of medical services available internally and the 
means to maintain them, and much more. 
(f) The international community must be prepared to function 
within Afghanistan to the maximum degree possible, even in the ab-
sence of clear governmental authority within the country.-Under 
such circumstances, it will be necessary for the international com-
munity to provide strong support to agencies which are expert in 
relief operations under sensitive political circumstances-primarily 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
(g) The United States should support the decision by the United 
Nations Secretary General to appoint as U.N coordinator such a 
distinguished person as Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. He has stat-
ure in both international diplomacy and relief operations to coordi-
nate international assistance both in and outside of Afghanistan.-
Because the repatriation program has been made possible through 
the United Nations negotiations and sanctioned by the Geneva ac-
cords, it was entirely appropriate for the Secretary General to 
maintain, through his representative, a leading role. 
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Given the complexity and size of the repatriation program, and 
the humanitarian needs within Afghanistan-as well as the 
number of U.N., international, voluntary agencies, and bilateral 
programs that are likely to be involved-international coordination 
will certainly be required. In this context, however, there should be 
no question that the lead agency for the repatriation program 
should be the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
who has the experience and ability as well as the presence in the 
field. 
II. POLICY ISSUES: WILL THERE BE PEACE IN 
AFGHANISTAN? 
The study mission's trip occurred in the midst of rumors that the 
Geneva accords were in the final stages of negotiation. In fact, 
what initially prompted the decision to make the trip was General 
Secretary Gorbachev's announcement on February 8, 1988 that the 
Soviet Union planned to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by 
the end of the year. If the Soviets were to follow through on Gorba-
chev's announcement, the situation inside Afghanistan could 
change so dramatically and so rapidly that the Afghan refugee pop-
ulation might embark on a sudden mass migratory return to Af-
ghanistan, thereby creating a serious challenge for the various 
international and private voluntary organizations involved in the 
refugee effort. Such a decision taken spontaneously and simulta-
neously by 5 million Afghan refugees-2 million in Iran and 3 mil-
lion in Pakistan-to return to their war-torn home country would 
pose a repatriation problem of historic proportions. 
(4) 
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It turned out that there was more than mere rumor behind the 
report that the talks were nearing completion. While the delega-
tion was in Pakistan, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 
and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Tashkent 
to meet with General Najibullah, the leader of the Soviet-backed 
regime in Kabul. And the day that the delegation arrived in 
Geneva to meet with representatives of the UNHCR and the ICRC 
(Thursday, April 7, 1988), U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez announced 
that an agreement had been reached and would be soon be signed. 
In fact, the accords were signed in Geneva one week later (Thurs-
day, April 14, 1988). , 
The primary purpose of the trip was to look at the refugee pro-
grams inside Pakistan and to examine plans for repatriation of the 
Afghan refugee population. But given the political atmosphere at 
the time, every conversation included extensive discussion about 
the impending accords, their impact on the situation in Afghani-
stan, and what the likely political and military scenarios for Af-
ghanistan might be-if and when, and after the Soviet army with-
drew from its 9-year occupation of that country. 
This section of the Report will present some of the views that the 
stud~ mission encountered on non-refugee matters. 
A. THE GENEVA ACCORDS 
The details of the accords were unknown at the time of our con-
versations in Pakistan, and the way in which "symmetry" between 
the Americans and the Soviets would be achieved was similarly un-
known. Nonetheless, there was a general understanding that the 
accords involved a commitment by the Soviet Union to withdraw 
its troops from Afghanistan within 9 months after implementation 
of the accords, and that Pakistan would, in return, pledge to re-
frain from any activities that "interfered" in internal Afghan af-
fairs, i.e., Pakistan would agree to terminate the use of Pakistani 
territory as a sanctuary for the Mujahidin. 
(1) THE MUJAHIDIN 
The spokesman for the alliance, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, ex-
pressed intense opposition to the accords. Hekmatyar's views were 
as follows: 
First, Geneva is meaningless without the participation or approv-
al of the Mujahidin. With or without the accords, the war will go 
on. The people are prepared to continue their sacrifice. There is no 
sign of fatigue. Time is on the side of the Mujahidin. They are 
better organized and better armed than ever before, and their 
morale is at an all-time high. The only way that a real peace can 
be achieved is for the real parties to the conflict-the Soviet Union 
and the Mujahidin-to engage in negotiations. The Mujahidin have 
offered to talk with the Soviets about (a) the pace and mode of 
their withdrawal, and (b) allowing their departure to occur without 
violence. But the Soviets decline to engage in any such negotia-
tions. 
Second, the Geneva process and the accords themselves benefit 
the Soviets. The Soviets came uninvited and without conditions. 
Why should they be able to extract concessions from the United 
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States and Pak.istan as a "price" for their departure? The Soviets 
have suffered an unprecedented military defeat, and Geneva 
simply pulls the rug out from under those who have won the victo-
ry. Geneva was designed to serve Soviet interests, and only when 
the accords were ready to be signed did the Americans and the 
Pakistanis realize exactly how the agreement helped the Soviets. 
The accords legitimize the Najibullah government and strengthen 
the Soviets' argument that outsiders are interfering in the internal 
affairs of Afghanistan. Evidence of the Soviets' real intentions can 
be found in their resistance to the Pakistani proposal for an inter-
im government and in their unhappiness at the American objec-
tions to continued Soviet military aid to Najibullah. The Soviets are 
trying to achieve at the negotiating table what they could not 
achieve with "murderous force" on the battlefield-that is, the sur-
vival of the N ajibullah regime. That is the Soviet purpose in 
Geneva-to guarantee Najibullah's future in exchange for the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
Third, the accords are "flawed" because they are premised on 
the notion that the war is about the Soviet military presence. That 
is only partly true. The war is also about the presence of a Commu-
nist government in Kabul. The war will not end until Najibullah is 
out and a non-Communist government is in Kabul. 
Fourth, the Pakistani government has no business in these nego-
tiations. The Pakistanis have no authority to negotiate for the 
Afghan people. In fact, the Pakistanis have a right only to be con-
cerned about the refugees. By participating in the talks, the Paki-
stanis have allowed the Soviets to create a rift between the Mujahi-
din and Pakistan, an important Soviet objective. 
Fifth, the accords place Pakistan in an untenable position. In ex-
change for the Soviet pledge to withdraw, Pakistan will pledge that 
its territory will not be used in the future by the Mujahidin. Paki-
stan must either comply, in which case the Mujahidin will have to. 
leave Pakistan, or Pakistan will have to violate the accords. If 
Pakistan signs this agreement with an intention to violate it, Paki-
stan shouldn't sign at all. 
(2) THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
In meetings with U.S. Ambassador Arnold Raphel in Islamabad, 
Consul General Michael Malinowski in Peshawar and Deputy As-
sistant Secretary Robert Peck in Geneva, these administration 
spokesmen stated their support for the accords, so long as the ac-
cords recognized the princple of "symmetry" with respect to Soviet 
military assistance to Najibullah and U.S. support for the Mujahi-
din. 
First, this agreement is historic in that it marks the first time 
since the Soviet withdrew from Austria in 1955 that the Soviet 
Union has agreed to withdraw its military forces from territory 
that it has occupied. In light of Gorbachev's new policies, historians 
might look back at this agreement and conclude that it represented 
a turning point in Soviet foreign policy-a decision to retrench and 
consolidate, to rebuild and modernize the Soviet economy rather 
than to continue to pursue adventurist, expansionist ambitions. 
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Second, in the absence of an agreement involving a formal com-
mitment by the Soviets to leave Afghanistan which includes specif-
ic deadlines for their departure, the Soviets have no formal obliga-
tion to withdraw all their forces from Afghanistan or to return to 
the pre-invasion borders. There is at least some danger that the So-
viets may try to create a redoubt in the North, a buffer zone inside 
Afghanistan which would result in a de facto partition of Afghani-
stan. The existence of the agreement adds to the pressure on the 
Soviets to get all the way out of Afghanistan. It is true that the 
Mujahidin forces are militarily much stronger than they used to 
be, but they have not yet taken any Soviet garrisons, and it is inac-
curate to say that the Soviets have been defeated militarily. The 
Soviets have decided only that they are unwilling to continue to 
pay the price of remaining in Afghanistan. A great power like the 
Soviet Union has the ability to carry on with a flawed policy-as 
the United States did in Southeast Asia-if it is willing to pay the 
price. This agreement simply codifies the Soviet's decision to leave 
entirely, rather than deploying to new positions within Afghani-
stan that are more tenable politically and militarily. 
Third, if the Mujahidin are so confident of their ability to over-
whelm the Najibullah regime after the Soviets depart, then the key 
to getting rid of Najibullah is, in fact, getting the Soviets out of Af-
ghanistan. Most Western analysts agree with the Mujahidin that 
no amount of Soviet aid will enable the Najibullah government to 
survive for more than a brief time. After all, the rate of desertions 
in the Afghan army has been so high, it is notorious throughout 
the world as the only army where more troops have fled than 
fought. The Mujahidin's second objective-a non-Communist gov-
ernment in Kabul-is not sacrificed in order to achieve the first ob-
jective-the Soviets' departure. On the contrary, they are inextrica-
bly linked, one leads to the other. The Soviets' withdrawal will 
make it possible for a government to emerge in Kabul that reflects 
the will of the Afghan people. 
Fourth, so long as the accords recognize the principle of symme-
try, the Mujahidin will not be disadvantaged-Le., they will contin-
ue to receive U.S. military assistance if Najibullah continues to re-
ceive Soviet assistance. 
Fifth, although no one believes that the mere departure of the 
Soviet troops will end the fighting, it will substantially diminish 
the scale and intensity of the violence. With the Soviets gone and 
with military assistance terminated, the conflict may well continue 
but at reduced levels of destruction. 
Sixth, the primary U.S. objective in Afghanistan has been to 
secure the withdrawal of Soviet forces, to reduce the threat to 
Pakistan and the Persian Gulf, and to impose a cost on Moscow for 
engaging in such adventurist policies. It is of less interest to the 
United States who or what faction is in power in Kabul so long as 
the government of Afghanistan is, in fact, a genuine national gov-
ernment and not just a Soviet puppet. 
Finally, the success of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is, in large 
measures, attributable to the sustained, bipartisan support for that 
policy in Congress. Our ultimate success in ending the Soviet occu-
pation and restoring Afghanistan to the Afghan people will also 
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depend upon maintaining and continuing that kind of broad and 
strong support for U.S. policy in the future. 
(3) THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN 
During an interview in Geneva, the Foreign Minister of Paki-
stan, Zain Noorani, added the following observations: 
First, rather than legitimating Najibullah, the accords place the 
Mujahidin on an equal footing with the Communist government in 
Kabul. The accords recognize Najibullah's party-the PDPA-as 
just another faction inside Afghanistan, not as a government. The 
Mujahidin can no longer be treated as "terrorists and bandits" as 
the Soviets have called them. 
Second, the accords place restraints on future Soviet action in 
two ways: if the Soviets do not withdraw from Afghanistan, they 
will have violated their commitment as set forth in the accords 
and, more importantly, the war will go on as before. If the Soviets 
continue to arm Najibullah, the Americans have the right to con-
tinue to arm the Mujahidin, thereby providing an incentive to the 
Soviets to stop arming Najibullah. In short, the accords set up a 
regime that promotes Soviet restraint in the future. 
B. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL 
Under the accords, the Soviet withdrawal must commence on 
May 15, 1988. The withdrawal must be completed within 9 
months-by February 15, 1989-and half of the Soviet troops must 
be out within the first 3 months-by August 15, 1988. 
Assuming that the Soviet troops are withdrawn in accordance 
with that schedule, various views were expressed on the following 
issues: · 
Issue No. 1.-Whether the Mujahidin commanders will pursue 
the Soviet troops as they withdraw, attacking the weakened Soviet 
positions as they leave, inflicting greater loss of life as an exercise 
in retribution and vengeance for the brutality of the Soviet occupa-
tion. There is an historic precedent for this kind of tactic in the 
19th century when the Afghans savagely attacked and decimated a 
departing British army. 
There were two responses to this question: Yes, the withdrawing 
Soviets would be attacked, said the spokesman for the Alliance 
(Hegmatyar). The Soviets had been given the opportunity to negoti-
ate their safe departure but had rejected it. And No, the people 
were tired of the bloodshed and would let the Soviet troops leave in 
peace, said one of the commanders we met in a refugee camp. 
In fact, there is reason to believe that there will be no coordinat-
ed policy by the Mujahidin. It is most likely that individual com-
manders will treat the departing Soviet troops not according to 
some national policy but as each individual command~r sees fit. 
Issue No. 2.-Whether the Mujahidin will continue the war if the 
Soviets do not withdraw beyond the pre-invasion borders. 
There was unanimity on this issue in principle. All Afghans said 
that the Soviets must withdraw all the way, or the war will contin-
ue. Western observers-mostly journalists-expressed reservations. 
They raised some doubt about whether the Mujahidin who live in 
the South will in fact be sufficiently committed to regaining terri-
85- 574 0 - 88 - 2 
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tory in the North actually to carry the war beyond their own vil-
lages and valleys. These observers say that, after Kabul falls, the 
Mujahidin will not behave as a national army but will revert to 
bands of warriors loyal to regional and local leaders. See Scenario 
No. 3 below. 
C. POST-SOVIET AFGHANISTAN 
Other issues of interest and concern to the delegation included 
various possible scenarios that might develop after the Soviets 
withdraw. Four scenarios seem possible: 
Scenario No. 1-The stalematel partition.-If the Soviets leave 
and Najibullah holds on, if Najibullah's party maintains control 
over Kabul and the northern provinces-or if there is only a par-
tial Soviet withdrawal-the result might be a de facto partition of 
Afghanistan with Najibullah's forces, supported by the Soviets, 
unable to occupy all of Afghanistan and unable to dislodge or 
defeat the Mujahidin, and the Mujahidin, supported and supplied 
by the West and governing through a provisional government, but 
unable to defeat or remove Najibullah. This is the most pessimistic 
scenario. With two competing governments locked in combat for 
control of the country, it is the formula for a protracted and bloody 
civil war. 
Scenario No. 2-An interim government.-If the various compet-
ing factions-including Najibullah's PDPA-are able to agree to an 
interim government, there could be an early peaceful resolution of 
the conflict. The interim government would operate from Kabul 
until nation-wide elections are held. This scenario, by far the most 
optimistic, might produce a peaceful and stable transition. 
Scenario No. 3.-Civil war without Najibullah.-If the Soviets 
withdraw, if Najibullah cannot hold on, and if efforts to forge an 
interim government are unsuccessful, there could be continued tur-
moil between and among the factions within the Mujahidin-an 
Afghan civil war without Najibullah. 
Scenario No. 4-Najibullah makes peace.-Many close observers 
of the Afghan political leadership believe that Najibullah is by far 
the shrewdest and most sophisticated political leader involved in 
Afghanistan today. He is said to be "a real survivor." It is conceiv-
able that Najibullah will try to split the Mujahidin by reaching out 
and negotiating a separate peace with various elements within the 
Mujahidin in an effort to isolate the fundamentalists. A Najibul-
lah-led coalition government could succeed if the Mujahidin revert 
to their old-time rivalries. 
The likelihood of each of these scenarios depends upon the fol-
lowing factors: 
-How long and whether the Najibullah regime will be able 
to hold out after the last Soviet soldier leaves Afghanistan. At 
least one expert believes that the Mujahidin and U.S. intelli-
gence seriously under-estimate the ability of Najibullah's 
party, the PDPA, to hold on. He sees Najibullah as being tough 
and competent, and the Afghan army as being able, with con-
tinued Soviet support, to maintain control over some areas of_ 
Afghanistan. In his view, the notion that, after the Soviets 
depart, the Mujahidin will be able to walk into Kabul and take 
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. over the government is "wildly unrealistic." Others suggest 
that Najibullah's government "will fall like a house-of-cards." 
-Whether U.N. mediator Diego Cordovez will be successful 
in his efforts to negotiate the establishment of an interim gov-
ernment that can effectively rule Afghanistan until nation-
wide elections can be held. Will the Mujahidin be willing to 
participate in a government that includes members of Najibul-
lah's party? Will Najibullah insist that he be a member of the 
interim government? 
-Whether the Mujahidin will continue to work together 
after the Soviets depart or whether, once the common enemy 
has disappeared, the coalition will fall apart and the various 
factions within the Mujahidin will begin fighting with one an-
other. And, even more likely, if Najibullah also departs, wheth-
er the Mujahidin will squabble among themselves about which 
faction should be dominant in Kabul? 
-Whether the Mujahidin commanders have any political 
loyalties, whether they really care about who is in Kabul, or 
whether their primary concern is to be left alone by whatever 
government is established in Kabul? 
-Whether the leaders of the alliance have the support of 
the Afghan people or whether the alliance will cease to exist 
as a relevant political force inside Afghanistan once the Sovi-
ets leave and the alliance leaders return; 
-Whether the people of Afghanistan are in fact prepared to 
accept a fundamentalist government. What is the level of sup-
port for the fundamentalist parties among the Afghan people? 
What is the likelihood of a fundamentalist government taking 
power in Kabul, and what impact would that have in the 
region~particularly with respect to the Muslim population in 
the Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union? 
-Whether the Afghan fundamentalists are like Khomeini or 
whether, because they are Sunni as opposed to Shia, the 
Afghan brand of fundamentalism is different from the Iranian. 
D. U.S. POLICY 
The study m1ss10n believes one reason for the success of U.S. 
policy in the region has been the sustained, or bipartisan support 
for that policy in Congress throughout two administrations, one 
Democratic, one Republican. The study mission believes that con-
tinued bipartisan support for U.S. policy is crucial, and to achieve 
that support, recommends that the primary aims of U.S. policy in 
the region should be the following: 
-(1) The withdrawal of all Soviet troops and advisers from 
all of Afghanistan and the elimination of the Soviet military 
threat to Pakistan and the Persian Gulf; 
-(2) A political resolution of the differences between the 
various Afghanistan factions-including the PDPA-that will 
end the fighting and produce a stable, independent, legitimate 
national government in Kabul; and 
-(3) A return of the 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan 
to Afghanistan. 
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The study mission believes that, to achieve these objectives, the 
United States should (a) support implementation and verification 
of the accords; (b) support the efforts of U.N. mediator Diego Cordo-
vez to establish an interim government in Afghanistan; (c) resist 
the temptation to recognize a provisional government-a sure-fire 
formula for a protracted civil war; and (d) continue to support 
those international agencies, such as the UNHCR and the ICRC, 
that will be involved with the repatriation of the Afghan refugees. 
The study mission believes that there are so many uncertainties 
and variables in the Afghan situation that U.S. policy should 
retain sufficient flexibility to accommodate any of the four scenar-
ios outlined above. For that reason, the study mission supports con-
tinued funding of U.S. programs for the Afghans at existing levels. 
The study mission has one word of caution with respect to the 
cross-border AID program now in progress. The United States 
should take care not to make the same mistake that has haunted 
the Soviet Union f~>r 9 years. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an 
outside power to determine winners and losers inside Afghanistan. 
Only the Afghan people are able to do that. 
The Soviet Union, even from the vantage point of a bordering 
nation and even with the use of 115,000 troops, could not impose its 
political will upon the people of Afghanistan. Accordingly, the 
United States should recognize its limited ability to affect the situ-
ation inside Afghanistan and should understand that whatever in-
fluence and leverage the United States can exercise with the Af-
ghans is, at best, attenuated. For that reason, the United States 
should take care that it not become identified with one Afghan fac-
tion over any of the others. The United States has no capacity to 
determine who will govern in Kabul, and we should take pains to 
avoid being embroiled in the inevitable competition that will arise 
among the Afghans as the Soviets depart. 
For that reason, the way in which the United States distributes 
its assistance to the Afghans in the future-which Afghans receive 
the aid, how and from whom-is a problem that deserves serious 
attention. It may well be wise, at this point, to multi-lateralize our 
cross-border AID operation so that other nations-e.g., Saudi 
Arabia, Pakistan, China-are also involved in this effort. 
III. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES: REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AND 
REPATRIATION 
The refugee program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is both a 
unique as well as a model example of how the United Nations Con-
vention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees would hope coun-
tries of first asylum would treat arriving refugees-and Pakistan is 
not even a signatory to the Convention or Protocol. For that the 
government of Pakistan deserves great credit in hosting a growing 
tide of refugees from Afghanistan for the past 10 years. 
It is "unique" in the sense that most of the Afghan refugees ar-
riving in the northwest frontier provinces of Pakistan are ethnical-
ly and tribally related. There has also been an historic movement 
of these people across what, to them, has been an internationally 
imposed (indeed, colonial British) boundary. Thus welcoming the 
arrival of ethnically related villagers was considered the only hos-
pitable thing to do. As Mr. Ahmed Zeb Khan, an officer with the 
Northwest Frontier Province Commission for Afghan refugees said 
during an interview, this ethnic similarity means the refugees 
"know how to behave as guests, and we know our duties as host." 
But, as related later in this report, this initial and generous wel-
come-while it has lasted for many years-has begun to fray. 
It has been "a model" in the sense that the relief and assistance 
programs established by the government of Pakistan, with the sup-
port and coordination of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
has been extraordinarily successful by any international standard. 
The coordination between governments, the United Nations, and 
the voluntary agencies has been, by all accounts, extremely effec-
tive. Obviously, there have been many problems-as related in this 
report-but by-and-large, most observers of international refugee 
programs rate the Afghan program in Pakistan as one of the more 
generous (on the part of the county of first asylum) and more suc-
cessful in terms of international support (through the UNHCR). 
For the past many years, the focus of the international program 
of humanitarian assistance has necessarily been on the care and 
maintenance of a growing refugee population-from a few thou-
sand before 1980 to an estimated 3 million this year. During this 
period, refugee "camps" (with temporary tents and relief facilities) 
have been transformed into refugee "villages" that can be hardly 
distinguished from local Pakistani villages in many areas. 
The focus today, however, is how these refugees and their tempo-
rary villages will be able to return to their native land. The 
Geneva accords, and the prospects they hold for a repatriation of 
· Afghan refugees, could represent one of the largest repatriation 
movements in recent history. In 1972, following the India-Bangla-
desh crisis, approximately 7 to 9 million Bengalis returned from 
India to their villages in Bangladesh-numerically one of the larg-
est repatriations in modern history. But, as a percentage of popula-
(13) 
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tion, it represented only 12 percent of East Bengal's population. 
Today, in Afghanistan, the return of 3 million refugees from Paki-
stan, 2 million from Iran, and the assistance of an estimated 1 mil-
lion (and possibly more than 2 million) internally dislocated Af-
ghans, will involve nearly 45 percent of Afghanistan's total esti-
mated population. In per capita terms, the Afghan repatriation 
could be one of the world's largest . . 
However, the repatriation of refugees from Pakistan is not likely 
to be sudden. For the very reason refugees flee their homelands-
conflict, violence and political strife-they are not likely to return 
until those conditions are resolved. In Afghanistan that may be 
some period of time. 
Most observers believe some spontaneous movement of a small 
number of refugees could begin in southern Afghanistan after the 
Soviet troops begin their withdrawal. However, most believe no 
large-scale, organized movement can begin until early next year-
perhaps beginning in the autumn, but mostly in the early months 
of 1989. The planting season, among many other factors, will clear-
ly help determine their movement. 
As in all refugee repatriations, refugees will likely return based 
upon their own-or their community's-realistic assessment of 
their prospects of survival, and many families will be able to rein-
tegrate successfully on their own without massive assistance. Hope-
fully, this prospect will offset expected gaps in assistance within 
Afghanistan. 
Adult males within the refugee families have already frequently · 
returned to Afghanistan as Mujahidin, and have visited their home 
villages. As a result, most refugees know the extent of damage to 
their property, and the effort that will be required to recultivate 
their fields and regain their livelihoods. 
A. REPATRIATION: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
The structure already exists in Pakistan to facilitate an orderly 
repatriation of Afghan refugees. The current relief program of the 
UNHCR and Pakistani government-as well as the U.S. AID cross-
border operation-have all the essential components needed to sup-
port a large-scale repatriation effort. The transition will be com-
plex and problematic, but possible. Given the time now available 
for proper planning as well as budgeting, the international commu-
nity can prepare for such a large-scale program. 
But while there is every possibility of the orderly movement of 
refugees from Pakistan, the international community must be pre-
pared to face far greater difficulties in assisting their rehabilitation 
and resettlement in the war-torn countryside of Afghanistan. Basic 
rehabilitation assistance within Afghanistan-such as the provision 
of transitional food supplies, seeds and farm implements, medi-
cines, public health and logistical support-is essential to create 
the conditions that will make it both possible and desirable for the 
refugees to return. Yet, providing these basic needs in Afghanistan 
will clearly be the greatest challenge facing the repatriation effort. 
Therefore the United Nations and the international community 
must be prepared to function within Afghanistan to the maximum 
degree possible, even in the absence of clear governmental author-
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ity. Refugees may be returning to Afghanistan before the political 
and military situation is fully settled. It is even possible that the 
current government in Kabul may not support the international 
community's efforts to assist the return of the refugees in areas 
they do not control, especially since most oppose the Najibullah 
government. Even more likely is the prospect that some of the 
Afghan resistance parties will try to stop refugees from returning 
or hinder the efforts of organizations working on repatriation until 
a political solution satisfactory to their faction is achieved. 
Under such circumstances, it will be necessary for the interna-
tional community to provide strong support to agencies which are 
expert in relief operations under sensitive political circumstances-
primarily the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In 
addition, the work of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
must be guided by pragmatism, rather than by Afghan politics, in 
determining its operation within Afghanistan-such as was neces-
sary for U.N. organizations which faced the Kampuchean famine. 
1. THE COSTS OF REPATRIATION 
In meetings in Pakistan, there were a wide variety of views as to 
the projected costs of the Afghan repatriation program. Refugee 
program officials outside Pakistan (in the United States and 
Europe) tended toward higher estimates, with costs as high as $1.5 
billion. But those working with the refugees in Pakistan-as well 
as personnel engaged in cross-border humanitarian assistance in 
Afghanistan-tended toward much lower estimates. In fact, certain 
Pakistan government officials believed the price of repatriation to 
be as low as $46 million, assuming also that the international com-
munity would for a period continue its food assistance to the 
Afghan refugees at current levels. 
In the meantime, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and 
the World Food Program has developed a provisional plan for rep-
triation from Pakistan which contains more reliable estimates. 
This plan currently is being circulated among likely donor govern-
ments for comment, and may later be developed into an official 
U.N. appeal to governments for assistance. 
The provisional U.N. plan recognizes the difficulty of projecting 
the number of refugees who will participate in an international re-
patriation effort, as opposed to simply returning spontaneously. It 
provides a scale of possible costs as follows: 
For 1 million refugees..... ... .... ................................ .. ...... ... .... ............... $130 million 
For 2 million refugees . ... .. ... .. ... .. ... .. .. ... .. . . ... .. .. . .. .. .. . .. ... .. ....... ... ... ..... .... 226 million 
For 3 million refugees . . .. .. . .. .. ... .. .. ... .. ... .. . .. .. .. ... .. ... .. .. .. . .. ..... .. . .. . .. ... .. .. .. 324 million 
These costs include the purchase of basic equipment required for 
repatriation; transport and other logistics over 1 year; and 6 
months of food assistance to each returnee. 
It is the sense of Pakistan government officials, voluntary agency 
staff, and others in the field that as many as one-third of the refu-
gees will return independently, with some estimating that as many 
as two-thirds will return on their own. While it is proper, for plan-
ning purposes, to anticipate the return of all 3 million refugees in 
Pakistan, it is probably more likely that only about 2 million will 
actually participate in the U.N. program. 
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However, the uncertainties of this repatriation--:-the fact that 
there are no facts about when and how this refugee population will 
return-require the continuation of international commitment to 
the relief program in Pakistan for the foreseeable future. While 
the likelihood is that the refugees will begin returning in large 
numbers next spring, or as early as this fall, the volatile political 
situation in Afghanistan may preclude their return until much 
later. In either case, the assistance programs in Pakistan must con-
tinue. 
Planning is also proceeding for longer-term development within 
Afghanistan. One estimate of the cost of rehabilitation and recon-
struction in Afghanistan over a 4-year period, prepared for the 
U.N. Development Program, was $1.3 billion. If the cost of the re-
patriation movement is added, UNDP estimated the figure to be 
over $1.5 billion. 
2. THE GENEVA ACCORDS, REPATRIATION, AND THE U.N. ROLE 
The accords signed in Geneva on April 14 were in four parts, one 
of which addressed specifically the question of refugee repatriation. 
The refugee instrument is intended to guarantee that well-estab-
lished international principles governing repatriation shall apply 
in this case. This includes, for example, the right to voluntary repa-
triation, the righty to freely exercise one's religion upon return, 
and other protections. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees is 
called upon to exercise his conventional role of ensuring that the 
repatriation proceeds properly, with full international protections 
for the returnees. 
Obviously, any repatriation program is complex, but the Afghan 
return is complicated by almost a decade of warfare and destruc-
tion in Afghanistan, the fragility of Afghan politics over the 
coming period, and the desperate needs which will exist within the 
country not only to resettlement returnees, but to restore some of 
the country's war-damaged infrastructure. 
These challenges call for the full array of international pro-
grams, and the U.N. Secretary General has taken the proper step 
in appointing Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan as an overall coordina-
tor who can make clear soon which agencies and which individuals 
are to fulfill what roles. 
Certain roles are already clear. Mr: Diego Cordovez, the U.N. of-
ficial who negotiated the Geneva accords, will now devote his ca-
pacities to monitoring its implementation. The U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees has a specific mandate under international law 
to facilitate repatriation. As such, UNHCR should be the lead 
agency for repatriation. The World Food Program has assured food 
delivery for the refugees for several years now, and should contin-
ue to help in the repatriation as well, in cooperation with UNHCR. 
And beyond repatriation will be the longer-term development 
needs of Afghanistan. 
To date, the politics of Afghanistan and the mechanisms of refu-
gee assistance have been to proceed independently. However, with 
repatriation, they become critically important pieces of a single 
mosaic, and the international community must support Prince Sa-
druddin as he assumes the overall coordination which will be re-
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quired within the United Nations and on behalf of the internation-
al community. 
3 . FACTORS INVOLVED IN REPATRIATION 
Any repatriation program must take into account several of the 
unique characteristics of the Afghan refugee scene. Many of these 
traits will facilitate the return of the refugees; others pose major 
impediments. 
A distinct advantage, for repatriation purposes, is that the vast 
majority of the refugees come from areas in Afghanistan which are 
proximate to Pakistan. One survey by Pakistani officials revealed 
that as many as 80 percent of the refugees are from within 250 kil-
ometers of the border. This narrows the logistical burden of repa-
triation considerably. In fact, it is likely that many refugees will be 
able simply to walk home. 
The same Pakistan government survey found that 90 percent of 
the refugees have rural, agrarian origins. This should limit the re-
quirements of repatriation. The vast majority of the refugees will 
return to retill the lands their families have farmed for genera-
tions. They will not be in the cities, requiring jobs, apartments, and 
other support. Most can survive with initial food and the agricul-
tural supplies to recultivate their farms. 
The protracted exile of the refugees has enabled the development 
of an impressive cast of individuals and organizations engaged both 
in the assistance of refugees and in humanitarian assistance pro-
grams across the border in Afghanistan. This network of voluntary 
agencies, Pakistani officials, U.S. personnel, and others will cer-
tainly prove invaluable in the repatriation effort. 
In particular, the various cross border humanitarian programs 
are an indispensable source of information on conditions in areas 
to which the refugees will return. Some voluntary agencies, such as 
those working in AID's humanitarian cross-border operation and 
the Swedish Development Committee, have already conducted sur-
veys of agricultural conditions in Afghanistan, the availability of 
medical services, and more. These agencies and their information 
should be used heavily in the repatriation. 
In addition, Pakistan possesses a logistical infrastructure capable 
of sustaining a major repatriation operation. The massive food re-
quirements of the 3 million refugees have been met using only one 
of Pakistan's seaports, Qasixp., without resort to others which could 
be used if expanded docking facilities are required. And a fairly im-
pressive array of commercial trucks has transported supplies to ref-
ugee settlements throughout the country. U.S. experts calculate 
that there is a great capacity for this system to expand quickly if 
necessary. 
Finally, the refugees themselves, while generally cautious, are 
nonetheless anxious to return home. The study mission found little 
basis to the claim that large numbers of Afghans will choose resi-
dence in Pakistan over a return to Afghanistan. In fact, most refu-
gee relief officials found it preposterous, knowing the refugees, that 
there is any reason to believe that anything more than a very 
small minority of Afghans will remain in Pakistan. Their over-
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whelming desire to go home should be a boost to efforts to reinte-
grate them into their homeland. 
But there are numerous challenges to repatriation as well. A 
steady refrain was the danger to repatriation of a vast array of 
land mines and other unexploded ordnance present throughout Af-
ghanistan, reportedly in large amounts. The number of civilian cas-
ualties of the war is already too high to be compounded by casual-
ties of the peace. Even now, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross is serving an alarming number of patients-many of 
them children-who have lost limbs due to land mines. And with 
an active repatriation program, this number could increase if the 
land is not cleared. 
Minimally, the parties to the conflict-the Mujahidin, the Kabul 
forces, and the Soviet military-should provide maps of land mines 
laid, where such maps may exist. But there is clearly a role here 
for the United Nations, with the assistance of the Soviet Union, 
the United States and others, to make every effort to clear the land 
of the remnants of war in order that repatriation may safely pro-
ceed. 
Another possible impediment to repatriation is the Peshawar-
based Afghan political parties. One senior Pakistani official re-
marked ruefully to the staff mission that exile Afghan party lead-
ers have had little to do with the refugees to date, and, in fact, 
some party heads have never even visited a refugee camp. But, the 
official forecasted, those same party leaders would now try to keep 
refugees from leaving Pakistan, thereby pressuring the internation-
al community to meet the leaders' political demands regarding Af-
ghanistan's future government. 
It is not known how much influence Afghan party officials will 
have over refugees yearning to return home. Certainly, the com-
ments of the Pakistani official have proved prescient, as certain 
party leaders are now rallying refugees to hold out. These party 
leaders have been an effective conduit for arms in the war in Af-
ghanistan; hopefully, they will not use those arms to stop refugees 
from going home. 
Finally, there are reports that war damage to Afghanistan's in-
frastructure is extensive, which adds to the repatriation challenge. 
Roads needed to haul food and other supplies to returnees have 
been destroyed. Irrigation systems which formerly supported 
Afghan agriculture have decayed or have been bombed, requiring 
speedy rehabilitation. 
While the restoration of Afghanistan's infrastructure is not a 
sine qua non for repatriation-since Afghans will return and re-
build, or survive without it-the international community should 
appreciate the difficulty it poses for successful resettlement. But in 
a poor and wartorn country, the United States and others must 
assist in this effort as well. 
IV. BACKGROUND TO THE AFGHAN REFUGEE PROBLEM 
A. OVERVIEW 
Afghanistan seized the international spotlight in December 1979 
when the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of combat troops into 
the Afghan capital, Kabul, to support an ailing Marxist party-a 
move that represented the first direct Soviet aggression against a 
non-aligned, independent country since World War II. 
Apart from the loss of over 500,000 Afghan lives since then, the 
most tragic consequence of this intervention has been the creation 
of the world's largest refugee flow. At least 3 million Afghans now 
reside in Pakistan, nearly 2 million have fled to Iran, and tens of 
thousands have been displaced within their own country. 
Parkistan, as a result, has had the single largest refugee popula-
tion in the world, hosting within its own borders more refugees 
than in east Africa, southeast Asia, and Central America com-
bined. Between Pakistan and Iran, Afghans constitute almost half 
of the estimated worldwide refugee population today. Tragically, 
the population of Afghanistan has been reduced by a third since 
1979, through death and forced migration. 
The refugee situation in Pakistan stands out from refugee crises 
elsewhere in several ways. First, Afghans have moved with relative 
ease; they are not confined to camps. They live in villages and near 
cities, own businesses, travel on buses and trains, and traverse, as 
Afghans have done for centuries, the borders between Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iran with surprising frequency and ease. 
Second, the refugees represent many ethnic groups, each of 
which is distinct in religious practice (though all are Muslim), lan-
guage, dress, and to some extent, history. Their experiences as Af-
ghans have been different, and they offer sometimes contrasting 
views of the country's predicament and how to confront it. 
Third, the Government of Pakistan has assumed a major role in 
the refugee relief effort and has shouldered much of the financial 
burden. By its estimates, Pakistan contributed approximately 48 
percent of the actual expenditures for refugee maintenance in 
fiscal year 1987. 
Fourth, Pakistanis are increasingly less accommodating of the 
refugees. As in many host countries, attitudes toward refugees 
often vary according to the prospects of their return and, in the 
Afghan case, voluntary repatriation has never been possible until 
now. Accordingly, refugees have increasingly been a source of ten-
sion. Sympathy for the Afghan cause and professions of Islamic sol-
idarity, however, continue to generate a sense of obligation in Paki-
stan toward the refugees. 
(19) 
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B. GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM 
Until 1979, Afghanistan had never been ruled by an outside 
power. Between 1953 and 1979, however, the Soviet Union, which 
shares more than a 1000-mile border with Afghanistan, concluded 
treaties and aid packages that yielded $2.5 billion of military and 
economic aid to its southern neighbor. The United States, mean-
while, devoted its attention to its relations with Iran and Pakistan. 
In 1965, the Soviet Union helped form Afghanistan's first Marx-
ist party, the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), 
now the country's only legal political party. The party soon faction-
alized, splitting into two groups, Khalq ("the Masses") and Par-
cham ("the Banner"), because of personality conflicts and ideologi-
cal and tactical differences. The former was led by N ur Mohamed 
Taraki, a writer, and Hafizullah Amin, a teacher, both from poor 
rural families; the latter was led by Babrak Karma!, a native of 
Kabul. 
In 1973, a former prime minister named Mohamed Daoud Khan 
seized power and disbanded the 100-year-old monarchy, convincing 
most observers, including the PDPA and the U.S.S.R., that he was 
keen to reverse the country's political embrace of the West. In 
keeping with the capricious nature of Afghan politics, however, 
Daoud subsequently outlawed all political parties, cracked down on 
the left and the fundamentalist right, and sought rapprochement 
with Pakistan and Iran. Although Moscow remained Afghanistan's 
chief economic benefactor, relations between the two countries 
soured, prompting the Soviets to pressure Khalq and Parcham into 
formal reconciliation. 
The PDPA was not, in the mid-1970's fit to govern the country. 
Apart from its divisiveness, it was an urban party with influence in 
Kabul but almost nowhere else and could claim only a few thou-
sand inexperienced members. But the repressive policies of Daoud, 
and a climate of unrest throughout the country, enabled the PDPA 
to carry out a coup in AP,ril 1978, to execute Daoud, and launch the 
"Great Saur Revolution. ' 
Most analysts agree that the Soviet Union, with only 350 advi-
sors in Afghanistan in early 1978, did not orchestrate the coup but, 
rather, helped consolidate it once it took place. This consolidation 
proved problematic, however. Once in power, the PDPA quickly fis-
sioned, while sporadic, counterrevolutionary guerrilla activity 
erupted in the countryside. With Taraki as President of the newly 
proclaimed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and Amin as the 
Deputy Prime Minister, the Khalq wing-the more radical and dog-
matic of the two Marxist factions-quickly elbowed out its party 
rival. Taraki "exiled" Babrak Karma!, the leader of the Parcham 
wing, to the ambassadorship of Czechoslovakia, while other Parcha-
mis were fired, arrested, or murdered. 
The new government promptly launched a series of reform meas-
ures far too radical and authoritarian for rural Afghanistan. Af-
ghanistan in 1978 was a conservative Muslim country with a liter-
acy rate of 5%. Ordinary villagers had much closer contact with 
the country's 300,000 mullahs, or local Islamic authorities, than 
with the central government, and were unaccustomed to heavy-
handed policies from Kabul. Although changes in the country's 
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social structure might have been desirable to many Afghans, the 
government's wanton attack on traditional life-from landholding 
patterns to marital customs-coupled with purges in Kabul, alien-
ated wide sectors of the Afghan population. 
Initially, the United States maintained ties with the new govern-
ment and continued our AID programs as well. The United States 
had provided more than half a billion dollars in economic aid to 
Afghanistan since World War II, supported a military training pro-
gram, provided scholarships to Afghan students, and fielded a 
Peace Corps contingent. All of these programs were phased out by 
October 1979. In February of that year, the American ambassador, 
"Spike" Dubs, had been assassinated in Kabul, prompting the 
Carter administration to withdraw most American personnel while 
the Soviets busily expanded their cadre of military advisors and 
their influence in the day-to-day functioning of the government. All 
aid to Afghanistan from non-Communist countries ceased during 
the autumn of 1979. 
The key figure through the autumn of 1979 was Hafizullah 
Amin, who staged his own coup in September and eliminated his 
former ally, Taraki. Amin was not trusted by the Soviets, however; 
in fact, Moscow had reportedly wanted Taraki to remove him. Even 
less sensitive to rural life than his predecessor, and having studied 
in the United States, he clearly did not enjoy the confidence of the 
Kremlin. His police-state tactics further damaged the credibility of 
the PDP A, while his reform package only further roused the oppo-
sition, plunging the country deeper into civil war. 
The Soviets turned to the exiled Babrak Karmal. On December 
27, 1979, after intense street fighting in Kabul, Afghan state radio 
announced the end of "the bloody apparatus of Hafizullah Amin" 
and the leader's summary execution. Within a month, the Soviets 
had 85,000 troops in Afghanistan and were vigorously attempting 
to resuscitate the PDPA and the Afghan Army, beset by defections 
and desertions, and quell mounting opposition throughout the 
country. 
C. THE REFUGEE FLOW: NUMBERS AND PEOPLE 
Although several hundred Afghan dissidents fled to Pakistan 
during the Daoud regime, and following the PDPA coup of April 
1978 and the Amin coup in September 1979, it was the Soviet inva-
sion that marked the real genesis of the Afghan refugee flow. 
An estimated 200,000 Afghans fled to Pakistan between the Saur 
Revolution and the Amin coup (April 1978-September 1979). That 
figure doubled between the Amin coup and the Soviet invasion 
(September-December 1979) and by the summer of 1980 roughly 
100,000 Afghans were reaching Pakistan every month. 
AFGHAN EXODUS 
End of: Afghans in Pakis tan 
1978.... ..... ..... ....... ... .. ........................ ... ................... .. ............. .... .. .. .. ... ................. 25,000 
1979.... ........ ... ........ .. ................... .. ..... ......... ........ ........ .. ..... ... ....... .... .... .... .... ... ... .. 400,000 
1980........... ... ..... ... ... .. ..... ....... ....... ...... ......... ... .... ... ..... .. ..... .. .... ..... ......... ..... ......... 1,400,000 
1981... ... ....... .... .... ..... ...... .. ....... ..................... ....................... .... ................. ....... .... 2,300,000 
1988 ....... ; ...................... ... ... .... ..... ........ ........ ........................ ... ............. ............. ... 1 3,200,000 
1 Estimated. 
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Refugees in the early years represented a wide cross-section of 
the Afghan population. Doctors, teachers, soldiers, mullahs, the 
maliks (village leaders), landlords, and shopkeepers joined farmers 
and herders in the exodus to Pakistan. Wealthier refugees left by 
plane whenever possible, heading to third countries or settling in 
urban areas in Pakistan. The vast majority, however, were illiter-
ate rural people, and fled on foot, taking whatever belongings and 
animals they could manage. 
The refugee population consists of a multitude of ethnic groups 
reflecting Afghanistan's ethnic diversity: the numerically and po-
litically dominant Pashtuns, or Pathans, who speak Pashto and in-
habit a wide belt stretching from northeastern to southern Afghan-
istan; the Dari-speaking Tajiks (Dari is a variant of Persian and 
the country's lingua franca), a Turco-Mongol ethnic group located 
primarily in the northeast; the Hazaras, a Dari-speaking Mongol 
race from mountainous central Afghanistan, traditionally the na-
tion's poorest and most underprivileged ethnic group; the northern 
Turkmen and Uzbeks, who speak Turkic dialects; and the Baluch, 
from the southwest. Other groups include the Qizilbash, the 
Kirghiz, and the Nursitanis. Regardless of ethnic affiliation, the 
refugees are Muslim; and most follow the Sunni, or orthodox, 
branch of Islam. The Hazaras are the largest Shia (Shiite) minority 
and, therefore, have important links with Iran, a fact that bears 
significantly on Iran's largely unnoticed involvement in the Afghan 
war. 
D. PAKISTAN'S REFUGEE POLICY 
As noted earlier, Pakistan has consistently maintained an open-
door policy toward Afghan refuges and has complied with the spirit 
of the 1951 U.N. Convention and the Protocol of 1967 without 
having actually signed either document. The entry, stay, and move-
ment of all foreigners in the country is regulated by the Foreigners 
Act of 1956, which has not been amended to include a temporary 
asylum category. Technically, therefore, refugees are illegal immi-
grants. In its public pronouncements Pakistan claims that it is ac-
commodating the Afghans according to its Islamic and humanitari-
an duties, and because of Pakistan's cultural, ethnic, and religious 
links with Afghanistan. 
At the same time, Pakistan has placed numerous restrictions on 
the refugees, though some are not enforced, while others have not 
realistically been enforceable. Generally, Pakistan has stressed, 
both in policy and rhetoric, the impermanence of the refugee situa-
tion. For instance, refugees are not permitted to purchase immov-
able property and are expected to dwell where the government as-
signs them. 
1. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE 
The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) sets refu-
gee policy in Pakistan. Under its jurisdiction are the Chief Com-
missioner for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), which oversees the logistics 
of the relief operation and functions as an attached department 
under SAFRON, and the Federal Committee for Relief of Afghan 
Refugees, which coordinates with voluntary agencies and the 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in as-
sessing the requirements of refugees and in distributing relief 
goods. 
A Commissioner for Afghan Refugees oversees implementation of 
refugee policy in each province and reports to the provincial Home 
Department and governor. The provinces involved are Sind, Balu-
chistan, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier Province (NFWP). 
About three quarters of the refugee population lives in NWFP, par-
ticularly around the capital, Peshawar. 
2. THE REFUGEE VILLAGE . 
The "refugee village" is the basic unit of settlement for Afghans. 
Some refer to these units as Refugee Tented Villages, but so few of 
the inhabitants now actually live in tents that the name is hardly 
appropriate. One reason the term was used by Pakistan at the 
outset was to stress the transience of the refugee population: 
The refugee village is designed to be self-sufficient. There are pri-
mary and secondary schools, usually segregated by sex according to 
local and Afghan custom, though there are far fewer schools for 
girls than boys. Local colleges and universities sometimes reserve a 
few seats for Afghans. Each village contains a basic health unit, 
provided on a scale of one per 15,000 refugees, which is staffed by 
nurses, midwives, dispensers, sanitary inspectors, and other medi-
cal personnel. 
What immediately distinguishes a refugee camp in Pakistan 
from refugee settlements in other countries is its resemblance to 
sprawling village rather than a refugee camp. Most inhabitants 
live in mud-brick huts within mud-walled compounds that they 
themselves have built and that require reconstruction every few 
years. Normally there are no enclosures around the settlement, no 
physical barriers to keep people from coming and going. Inside, 
there is usually a central thoroughfare lined with shops including 
bicycle repair, tailoring, meat and vegetable stalls, hair-cutting, 
and other small businesses. There is, finally, the mosque, usually 
the tidiest and best-maintained structure in the settlement. 
E. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND !Ts IMPACT 
The international community began aiding Afghan refugees in 
the fall of 1979. During the preceding months, refugees sustained 
themselves through Pakistani and other local support, and through 
their own ingenuity. Since the border that divides Afghanistan and 
Pakistan also splits certain ethnic groups (the Pashtun and the 
Baluch in particular), creating "cross-border tribes," many refugees 
were welcomed by clan members in Pakistan, who extended hospi-
tality in exchange for favors, labor, or support in local conflicts. 
Hospitality to those in need is also an important tenet of Islam. 
1. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
Since 1980, the international community has borne an increasing 
share of the Afghan refugee burden that costs roughly $1 million a 
day. UNHCR established its offices in October 1979 and through 
1986 has spent nearly $600 million on refugee programs. The 
World Food Program (WFP) spends roughly $125 million annually 
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on its operation, which in 1986 involved the delivery of more than 
500,000 tons of food. In 1987 WFP appealed to its international 
donors for 400,000 metric tons of wheat, 21,000 metric tons of 
edible oil, and 14,000 metric tons of sugar. Contributions to Paki-
stan under bilateral programs, meanwhile, include trucks ancl 
spare parts from West Germany and Japan, ambulances from 
China and South Korea, kerosene from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
and medical equipment from Norway. 
Working closely with Pakistan and voluntary agencies, UNHCR 
coordinates international aid and supervises the implementation of 
relief efforts. At the outset, UNHCR focused on the immediate 
needs of recent arrivals, particularly with respect to health, shel-
ter, and water. By late 1984, most refugee concentrations were ade-
quately served in these areas. Accordingly, in 19~5 UNHCR shifted 
its focus from basic relief and maintenance to self-reliance, concen-
trating in particular on income-generating schemes and vocational 
training, education, and veterinary services for livestock. These sec-
tors have accounted for 30 percent of UNHCR's budget for Paki-
stan, which for 1987 was targeted at $52 million-a significant de-
crease from 1986, but still a larger amount than any UNHCR 
budget elsewhere in the world. 
One of the most widely publicized and ambitious projects that 
UNHCR assisted has been a joint income-generating scheme with 
Pakistan and the World Bank. Started in early 1984, the scheme 
consists of dozens of sub-projects aimed at improving the Pakistani 
infrastructure and repairing environmental damage in heavily ref-
ugee-impacted areas. Operating on a budget of $20 million, the 
project seeks to employ equal numbers of refugees and locals in ef-
forts ranging from reforestation and road-building to flood control 
and fish breeding. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) fills a vital 
role in the relief effort. ICRC primarily assists war-wounded Af-
ghans. It operates surgical hospitals in Peshawar and Quetta, 
mobile medical teams in NWFP and Baluchistan, and a paraplegic 
center and prosthesis workshop in Peshawar. ICRC also trains 
teams of Afghan sanitarians and orderlies to assist war victims 
inside Afghanistan. 
2. U.S. ASSISTANCE 
The United States and Pakistan are the largest contributors to 
the welfare of Afghans in Pakistan. The United States channels its 
aid primarily through two channels: U.N. agencies and the volun-
tary agencies. To UNHCR, the United States pledged $17 million in 
1978 for Afghan relief, or almost a third of UNHCR's program 
budget for the year, earmarking portions of its contribution for 
income-generating projects, the construction of water supply sys-
tems and access roads in Baluchistan and the Punjab, and the fur-
ther refinement of the health care delivery system. Since 1980, U.S. 
assistance to UNHCR has averaged $20 million annually. The 
United States also contributes to the reforestation portion of the 
UNHCR World Bank project. 
Under PL-480 Title II, WFP has received close to $350 million in 
food commodities from the United States since 1979. PL-480, or the 
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Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, au-
thorized the Food for Peace Program, the major program through 
which the United States provides food assistance to other nations. 
Title II authorizes the donation of U.S. agricultural commodities to 
nations for the purpose of alleviating famine or providing disaster 
relief, combatting malnutrition, and encouraging economic and com-
munity development. 
Meanwhile, the United States continues to SUPJ>Orl a variety of 
smaller agencies and projects. In the early 1980 s, the American 
focus was primarily on the health sector, but, in keeping with Paki-
stan policy, has since broadened to address the larger issue of self-
reliance. The agencies that have received U.S. funding since the 
early 1980's are Church World Service (preventative/curative 
health care programs), Catholic Relief Service (health education 
and sanitation), the International Rescue Committee (health care 
and education), the Salvation Army (health care and vocational re-
habilitation/self-help), and Americares (the Afghan Female Surgi-
cal Hospital). In 1985, the United States started funding a Save the 
Children Federation income-generating project that targets widows 
and families with no alternative sources of income. 
One of the recurring headaches for the donor community has 
been the "numbers game" -determining the size of the refugee 
population in general, and the size of refugee households in par-
ticular. A 1986 joint WFP/UNHCR mission report lamented that 
"the mobility and ingenuity of the Afghan refugees has continually 
frustrated the best efforts of Pakistan to determine an accurate 
population figure. Similarly, the absence of a reliable population 
figure has made it difficult in the past to determine the quantities 
of emergency food aid required." 
U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM 
[In millions of dollars] 
FY Obligations/Organization 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1980- 87 Total 
UNHCR {$) ..................... ................... 5.0 30.0 24.2 23.0 20.1 19.7 15.17 17.427 154.6 
UNHCR {R) ........................ ................ 3.8 2.6 3.0 3.5 3.0 2.3 3.80 4.197 26.1 
World Bank {R) ................................ .................. ................................................ .8 1.0 ................ 3.000 4.8 
WFP* {$) .......................................... 31.9 39.3 70.6 37.3 42.2 40.0 25.28 37.400 324.0 
WFP Monitors {$) .......... ..................................................................................................................................... .103 .1 
WFP Monitors {R) ................................................................................................. .. .. .. .. ...... .2 .................................. .2 
ICRC {$) ..... .. ..................................... .3 1.0 .7 1.0 1.4 .7 1.00 1.000 7.1 
ICRC {R) ............................................................................. .3 .5 .8 .8 .78 1.200 4.3 
Licross {R) ......................................... 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 .8 .70 .700 7.2 
Subtotal ..................................... 42.0 73.9 99.8 66.3 69.3 65.5 46.73 65.027 528.6 
American Volags: 
AMERICARES {$) ............................................... ................. .. ............ ... ........ ................... ........... .12 .................. .1 
CRS {$) ..................................................... .2 ................ .3 .. .. .. .......... .4 .38 .078 1.3 
CRS (R) ..................................................... .6 ................. ............................... .I .................................. .7 
cws ($) .................................................... .5 .4 .4 .5 .6 .22 .173 2.8 
CWS (R) .................................................... .3 ................................................ .2 .41 .416 1.3 
Ell ($) ....................................................................................................................................................... .269 .2 
IRC ($) ...................................................................... .7 ................ .3 .3 .53 .442 2.2 
IRC (R) .......................... .. ........... ............... .3 ................................................ .2 .31 .485 1.3 
MF ($) ....................................... ............................ .................................................................................... .205 .2 
SA ($) .................................. ..................... .2 ................ .5 .4 .5 .75 .670 3.0 
SCF ($) ..................................................................................... ................... .............................. .05 .129 .I 
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U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFGHAN RELIEF PROGRAM-Continued 
[In millions of dollars] 
FY Obligations/Organization 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1980-87 Total 
WVRO ($) ................................... ............................................................................................... .0 
-------- - - ----- ---------
Vo lag Subtotal....................... 2.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 2.3 2.77 2.867 13.5 
Government of Pakistan....................... 8.0 ................. .3 ................................ 8.3 
==================== 
Total by FY............................ 42.0 84.0 100.9 67.5 70.8 67.8 49.50 68.596 551.1 
Notes, 
FY 1987 figures rounded to nearest $1,000. 
FY 1986 figures rounded to nearest $10,000 
Previous years' figures rounded to nearest $100,000. 
$ U.S. Dollars 
R Non-appropriated excess foreign currency (Pakistan rupee) contribution. FY 1987 exchange rate equaled 17.21 rupees per dollar. 
• PL-480, Title II excess food commodities (wheat, vegetable oil, dried milk) provided through World Food Program. Includes value of 
commodities and shipping. 
CRS=Catholic Relief Services; CWS=Church World Service; IRC=lnternational Rescue Committee; SA=Salvation Army; SCF=Save The Children 
Federation (U.S.) EIL=Experiment in International Living MF=Mercy Fund; WVRO=World Vision. 
Wheat Donors 
Australia ...... . 
Belgium ..................... .. 
Canada ....................... .. 
EEC ............................ .. 
DONOR PLEDGES: WFP PROGRAM FOR AFGHANS IN PAKISTAN 
1980 1981 
10,000 





[All figures in metric tons] 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
10,000 25,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 
1 25,000 1 5,000 




1 57,915 1 33,060 136,026 1 50,000 138,000 



























FRG ............................ .. 
Italy .......................... . 
Japan ......................... .. 
Kuwait ........................ . 
Netherlands ................ .. 
Norway ...................... .. 
OPEC .......................... .. 
PRC ........................... .. 
Switzerland ................ .. 
Turkey ........................ .. 
UK ........................ .. 
USA .................... .. 
115,000 1 5,000 15,000 1 5,000 1 6,000 
1 7,500 115,650 127,069 1 25,500 121,635 39,053 1 31,101 
3,000 3,000 
1 3,000 

















114,650 1 7,877 18,500 1 31,027 
98,036 161,460 136,317 180,000 149,542 150,000 160,000 165,000 165,000 1,200,355 
Total ................... 141,828 361,388 329,013 439,120 342,502 353,961 479,010 452,101 165,000 3,063,923 
1 Indicates bilateral contribution through WFP. All other figures are for contributions to WFP Program Wang # 1380L Rev 02/24/88. 
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Refugees have used a variety of techniques to inflate their family 
size to acquire more than their monthly allotment of food. They 
might sell or loan their passbooks, in which the receipt of rations is 
stamped; deny food monitors access to their households on the 
grounds that non-family members are forbidden to set eyes on the 
resident women; or bribe Pakistani officials. They also double-regis-
ter. Local Pakistanis sometimes pose as refugees. Particularly in 
Baluchistan, refugees let the "ration malik" function as the provid-
er, which goes against the wishes of the UNHCR that rations go 
through family heads only. As a result, some refugees live well 
while others struggle, and new arrivals have sometimes gone un-
registered for months. 
Pakistan estimates that there are also 300,000-400,000 unregis-
tered Afghan refugees. Registration delays have been caused by 
several factors: the isolation of some border crossings, the difficulty 
of distinguishing genuine new arrivals from imposters seeking to 
re-register, and the Pakistan policy of closing registration in cer-
tain areas to avoid upsetting the population balance between locals 
and refugees. Some new arrivals have waited weeks or months for 
regular rations, living on handouts and loans from relatives or 
from the registered population. Even for the registered population, 
food distribution has been limited and erratic. 
F. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REFUGEE SITUATION 
In spite of many problems in the relief pipeline, the vagaries of 
the distribution system, occasional disharmony between relief agen-
cies, the shortage of managers and trained personnel, the relief 
effort has been remarkably successful. The condition of most refu-
gees has shown considerable improvement since 1980; mud-walled 
houses have replaced clusters of tents in barren landscapes, and 
basic relief requirements have been met. Malnutrition exists but 
only in pockets, and medical care, described in a 1981 congressional 
report as "so minimal as to be virtually nonexistent," has today 
improved remarkably. 
1. HEALTH AND NUTRITION 
As always, children remain the most vulnerable category in 
terms of health and nutrition. A Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
survey in 1986 computed an infant-mortality rate of 80 per 1000 
live births in its random sample; the rate was higher in Baluchi-
stan than in NWFP. The major causes of mortality were gastroin-
testinal disorders, tetanus, and measles. The CDC findings suggest 
that roughly a third of child deaths are diarrhea-related, a sobering 
statistic given that probably 20 percent of the entire registered pop-
ulation is under 5 years of age-and what conditions these children 
will face during a repatriation to war-ravaged Afghanistan. 
The overall nutritional status of the refugees is adequate and 
may, in fact, be better than that of the local Pakistani population 
in some areas. Some health personnel report that a major detri-
ment to nutritional well-being among infants is the tendency of 
mothers to prolong breast feeding without supplements until well 
beyond the child's first birthday, and not to provide calorie-dense 
foods during the weaning period. 
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Anemia remains the main micro-nutrient deficiency, affecting 
women of child-bearing age in particular. High rates of worm infes-
tation, repeated pregnancies, and a wheat-based diet all contribute 
to this problem. That refugees continue to suffer from basic ail-
ments and easily treated diseases underlines the urgency of supple-
mentary feeding programs, especially in the context of a future re-
patriation program. 
2. EMPLOYMENT 
Apart from receiving food rations, on which they depend for 
meeting basic nutritional needs, many Afghans are able to supple-
ment their diet with purchased commodities. To the dismay of 
many Pakistanis, refugees have moved securely into the local econ-
omy in many areas and, therefore, have outside incomes. They run 
small businesses in the refugee villages; work in nearby rural areas 
(a move that Pakistan has, at times, encouraged to ease congestion 
in certain market sectors); commute to nearby towns on buses 
owned and operated by other Afghans; leave for several weeks to 
mine coal or build roads; work with voluntary agencies; move to 
Karachi and the Gulf states; come and go to Iran; bring carpets out 
of Afghanistan and open shops in urban areas; and cook and 
housewatch for expatriates. The standard wage for unskilled labor 
in 1987 was 25-30 rupees a day, or about $1.50. 
Women do not have the same mobility as men. Traditional 
Afghan rural culture discourages women from having a substantial 
role outside of the home, even from being educated. A number of 
voluntary agency-sponsored income-generating projects target 
women, however, providing them with handicraft material and lo-
cating markets for their products, such as carpets. 
To carve out an economic niche for themselves, many Afghans 
have taken up residence in urban areas. Cities and towns also draw 
refugees who can afford to live outside the refugee village and, 
therefore, the distribution network. The populations of Peshawar 
and Quetta are roughly a quarter Afghan now; there are also size-
able refugee neighborhoods in Islamabad and Karachi. Refugees 
rent houses, live in hotels, or pitch tents in vacant lots. Families 
will occasionally split up, with the father moving to town to find 
work while the mother remains in the refugee village with the chil-
dren, or some of them. 
3. OVERSEAS RESETTLEMENT 
Third-country resettlement has not played an important role in 
the Afghan situation. The majority of refugees clearly prefer to 
return to their own country, an opportunity they will soon have. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1987 the United States had resettled 
about 20,000 Afghans, many ot them well-educated urbanites. The 
largest resettlement areas are in Washington, D.C., New York City, 
the San Francisco Bay area, and Los Angeles. While there are few 
detailed studies on the subject, it is widely believed that many Af-
ghans are not adjusting easily to American society. Like most refu-
gees, Afghans were proud and independent in their native land, 
where they place a premium on providing hospitality and enter-
taining guests. Many now remain socially isolated in the United . 
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States, uneasy with cultural disparities, the loss of status, the diffi-
culty of finding jobs commensurate with positions held previously, 
and the decision to place family needs ahead of the resistance 
struggle. The majority of Afghans in the United States also express 
a desire to return to Afghanistan someday, a desire that may de-
tract from their ability or desire to set long-term goals in the 
United States. 
Other countries that have resettled Afghans include Turkey, 
Australia, Canada, and West Germany. 
V. IMPACT ON PAKISTAN OF REFUGEE PROBLEM 
The signing of the Geneva accords, and the prospect for the first 
time in over 9 years that large numbers of Afghan refugees might 
be able to return to their homes, could not have come at a more 
critical time for Pakistan. 
Over the past few years, the presence of millions of Afghan refu-
gees in Pakistan has exacted an ever-increasing toll monetarily, en-
vironmentally, and politically. The continuing Afghan refugee pres-
ence, with no end in sight, has been viewed by many Pakistanis 
with growing alarm. Indeed, most observers in the field believe 
that had a settlement not been reached this year-had the Afghan 
refugees been forced to remain in Pakistan for several more 
years-tensions between the refugees and local Pakistanis could 
have reached an explosive point and become a serious political 
issue for the Pakistan government. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent influx of 
refugees clearly raised a number of critical issues for Pakistan. En-
vironmentally, Afghan refugees have denuded whole valleys of 
trees while their 2-3 million livestock have trampled or gobbled 
thousands of acres of vegetation, causing serious erosion problems. 
Economically, the refugee's presence has cost Pakistan consider-
ably, despite generous international support. A nation with a per 
capita income of only $400, Pakistan spent $17 4 million for refugee 
assistance in fiscal 1987. Refugees, meanwhile, have generated re-
sentment because of their penetration into local economies and in-
fringement on scarce resources. 
In terms of security, the presence of the Afghan refugee resist-
ance has drawn Soviet and Afghan aircraft to bomb and strafe tar-
gets inside Pakistan, killing and wounding both refugees and local 
citizens. Foreign agents, blending in with the refugee population, 
have planted with growing regularity bombs at hospitals and 
schools, or in bazaars and vegetable carts. Over the past several 
months, a week has not gone by without further loss of life. Final-
ly, due to the amount of arms flowing in and out of Pakistan, a 
climate akin to the old American West prevails along the Afghan 
border. The intermittent rioting in Karachi is partly the result of 
Afghan (Pashtun, specifically) involvement in arms and drug traf-
ficking. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, the refugees are the root 
cause of many of these troubling developments. 
Although the Afghan refugee crisis triggered a massive aid pro-
gram for Pakistan, and perhaps elevated that country's status in 
the Muslim world, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had clearly 
placed Pakistan in a vulnerable position. As a result, Pakistan has 
led the opposition to the Soviet presence from the outset. A central 
component to that opposition has been its unofficial acquiescence 
as a conduit for aid to the resistance. 
(30) 
VI. FORCES LEADING TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
The settlement that has been reached in Geneva is clearly the 
result of forces at work in the field for some years-the growing 
military pressure of the Afghan resistance (the Mujahidin), the in-
ability of Soviet troops to eliminate or really control those forces, 
and the weakness and vulnerability ofrthe regimes in Kabul. From 
the interplay of those forces over the past several years, but par-
ticularly last year, decisions were reached in Islamabad, Washing-
ton, and especially in Moscow, that have led to the prospect of a 
settlement and the repatriation of millions of Afghan refugees. 
An unobstructed assistance pipeline through Pakistan has been 
crucial to efforts to aid the Mujahidin, and the CIA has directed 
the largest American covert operation since the Vietnam war 
across the border into Afghanistan. While some Middle Eastern 
and Asian countries-Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China-also 
assisted the rebels, the U.S. aid package alone, consisting of weap-
ons, ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, and money for food, 
reached an estimated $630 million in fiscal year 1987. This package 
comes on top of a $3.2 billion, 6-year economic and 5-year military 
assistance program to Pakistan that began in 1981 and that Con-
gress renewed, with stipulations, in the fall of 1987. 
Publicly, the United States has been an unwavering supporter of 
the Mujahidin since 1979, as has the United Nations, whose resolu-
tions condemning foreign intervention in Afghanistan have passed 
by large margins every year. 
A. U.S. ASSISTANCE 
Since late 1984, when Congress approved a resolution (Senate 
Congressional Resolution 74) calling on the United States to "sup-
port effectively the people of Afghanistan in their fight for free-
dom," the United States has escalated the aid program across the 
border. In April 1985, President Reagan issued a National Security 
Decision Directive calling on the United States to drive Soviet 
forces from Afghanistan "by all means available." The Senate fol-
lowed its earlier pronouncements with a resolution in January 
1987 to "renew its commitment . . . to support the people of Af-
ghanistan through the provision of appropriate material support." 
The upshot was an increase in both the quantity and sophistication 
of weapons supplied to the guerrillas, and the appearance inside 
Afghanistan of U.S.-directed humanitarian assistance programs. 
In terms of weapons, the most significant development was the 
provision of ''Stinger" missiles to the Mujahidin. The Stinger is a 
portable, 34 pound, heat-seeking, shoulder fired antiaircraft missile 
which the guerrillas have used with increasing effectiveness since 
shipments and training began in late 1986. The Stinger was the 
latest addition to an arsenal that already included rocket-propelled 
(31) 
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grenade~,/Sam-7 heat-seeking missiles, tanks, semiautomatic rifles, 
and whatever else the insurgents have captured on their own. 
While better training and weaponry increased the fighting power 
of the Mujahidin, it is widely believed among officials involved 
with the pipeline that anywhere from 20-70 percent of U.S. mili-
tary aid for the insurgents never reached its real destination; 
rather, for reasons ranging from expediency to personal profit, it 
has been appropriated, traded, sold, or hidden by groups with 
access to the shipments-to the Pakistan armed forces, Afghan po-
litical parties based in Peshawar, rebel commanders or individual 
guerrillas. 
Meanwhile, in 1985, the United States developed an AID admin-
istered cross-border humanitarian assistance program for Afghani-
stan. Its short-term component has consisted of grants in foreign 
assistance that are typically made to American and European vol-
untary agencies in Pakistan, which then transfer the funds to non-
American groups operating inside Afghanistan. In 1987, some $30 
million in U.S. grants supported medical clinics inside Afghanistan, 
medical training for Afghans, food provisions for deficit areas 
inside Afghanistan; and a variety of activities aimed at strengthen-
ing education, transportation, and commodity support in rebel-held 
areas. 
A longer term component is a larger, more ambitious, and more 
controversial part of the cross-border program. Its emphasis has 
been sectoral. In the health sector, the goal has been to develop ex-
tensive curative health services for war-related injuries and pre-
ventive services for basic public health, including maternal and 
child care. In education, the aim has been to support and improve 
existing lower schools in resistance-controlled areas, which would 
include training teachers, providing school supplies, and funding 
school construction. In agriculture, the focus has been on the at-
tainment of self-sufficiency through the provision of agricultural 
extension and technical assistance. And in commodity support, the 
task has been to make available food, agricultural inputs, and a 
range of humanitarian goods to encourage the continuation of food 
production in rural Afghanistan. 
The objectives of the cross border program were, and continue to 
be, humanitarian. The underlying rationale is that a continued ref-
ugee flow debilitates the resistance and overtaxes Pakistan eco-
nomically and politically. The immediate objective was to improve 
the ability of Afghans to sustain themselves inside Afghanistan. 
Strategists hope that, as a result, emigration from rural areas to 
Soviet-Afghan government controlled urban areas . would decline, 
and that Afghans in Pakistan will voluntarily return to resistance-
controlled areas. 
AID administers the cross-border program through its Represent-
ative for Afghan Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, an 
office that was established in September 1985 and is staffed by 
career.AID personnel. Probably the most important function of this 
office has been to work closely with the seven-party Mujahidin alli-
ance, the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Muyahidin, in identifying 
target areas. These seven resistance groups, which have formed 
health, education, and logistics committees to oversee the imple-
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mentation of the program, channel whatever goods and equipment 
AID provides to field commanders inside Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Affairs office also oversees an Economic Support 
Fund program, a PL-480 Title II emergency relief food grant 
(wheat and soybean oil) for war-affected Afghans, and the imple-
mentation of the Department of Defense-funded "McCollum 
Amendment" program. The Economic Support Fund makes avail-
able funds for the provision of food, medicine, or other humanitari-
an assistance for the Afghan people. The McCollum Amendment 
(Section 308 of PL-235) calls for the Secretary of Defense to "pro-
vide nonlethal assistance . . . to persons displaced or who are refu-
gees because of the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union." 
Nonlethal assistance comes primarily from Department of Defense 
surpluses and from private American groups; the Denton Amend-
ment (1984) authorizes the Pentagon to transport humanitarian aid 
provided by private groups, on military aircraft at no cost, when 
space is available. McCollum funds have also financed the trans-
portation of Afghans to the United States for medical treatment; as 
of June 1987, 325 patients had been moved under the program. 
Congress earmarked $15 million in ESF funds for war-affected Af-
ghans in fiscal year 1986, and added $30 million to the program in 
fiscal year 1987. The PL-480 program cost $15 million in 1986, 
while 1986 funds for the McCollum program amounted to $10 mil-
lion. 
B. UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION 
Although the crucial point in breaking the deadlock and pro-
longed conflict in Afghanistan was the decision by the Soviet 
Union, as announced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, to 
withdraw, unilaterally if necessary, all Soviet forces from the coun-
try-that decision might not have occurred without the negotia-
tions launched in 1982 by the United Nations Secretary General. 
No international agreement could have been reached without the 
neutrality, the persistence and patience of the United Nations ne-
gotiator, Mr. Diego Cordovez. 
The Geneva talks had taken place intermittently since June 
1982. Representatives from Pakistan and Afghanistan did not meet 
face-to-face, however; negotiations were conducted by Mr. Cordovez 
between Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran. (Iran, although home to an 
estimated two million Afghan refugees, had refused to participate 
directly because the Afghan Mujahidin were not officially repre-
sented in the negotiations.) 
As signed in Geneva, and as described earlier, the accords consist 
of four instruments: non-interference, international guarantees 
concerning non-interference, the repatriation of refugees, and 
"interrelationships," or the relationship between a Soviet with-
drawal and an end to Pakistan's support for the resistance; [See 
Appendix for text]. 
Those accords are truly the force that will hopefully lead to 
peace and stability in Afghanistan-and to the opportunity for mil-
lions of its refugees to return to their homes and lands. 
APPENDIX 
FINAL TEXT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS 
April 13, 5 p.m., 1988 
BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MUTUAL RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR ON NON-INTERFERENCE AND 
NON-INTERVENTION 
The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties, 
Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourli-
ness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace 
and security in the region, 
Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interfer-
ence and non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of 
States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and for the fulfillment of the purposes 
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine 
their own political, economic cultural and social systems in accord-
ance with the will of their peoples, without outside intervention, 
interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsover, 
Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as 
well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the prin-
ciple of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the 
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference 
in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conduct-
ed in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and 
non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States. 
ARTICLE II 
For the purpose of implementing the principle of non-interfer-
ence and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes 
to comply with the following obligations: 
(1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial 
integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other 
(35) 
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High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cul-
tural heritage of its people; 
(2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other 
High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, eco-
nomic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international re-
lations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural re-
sources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without out-
side intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in 
any form whatsoever; 
(3) To refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatso-
ever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt 
the political, social or economic order of the other High Contract-
ing Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other 
High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension be-
tween the High Contracting Parties; 
(4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which 
would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial in-
tegrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and 
social stability of the other High Contracting Party; 
(5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occu-
pation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or 
covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of 
military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs 
of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal in-
volving the use of force; 
(6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or 
under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability 
of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions; 
(7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, 
direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the 
other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or 
from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to under-
mine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting 
Party; 
· (8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financ-
ing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the 
purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting 
Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the 
other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, in-
cluding financing for the training, equipping and transit of such 
mercenaries; 
(9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with 
other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and 
external affairs of the other High Contracting Party; 
(10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hos-
tile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the 
internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party; 
(11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist 
groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Con-
tracting Party; 
(12) to prevent within its territory the presence, harbouring, in 
camps and bases or otherwise, organizing training, financing, 
equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and other 
groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in 
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the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly 
also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of 
arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups; 
(13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be 
considered as interference or intervention. 
ARTICLE III 
The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. 
ARTICLE IV 
Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Con-
tracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this 
Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agree-
ment enters into force. 
ARTICLE V 
This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu 
languages, all texts being equally authentic. In the case of any di-
vergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. 
Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of 
April 1988. 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Afghanistan: 
For the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 
DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES 
The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
of the United States of America, 
Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Is-
lamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political 
settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neigh-
bourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen inter-
nationalf peace and security in the region; 
Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objec-
tives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect 
for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-
alignment; 
Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference 
and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghani-
stan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the com-
mitments contained in the bilateral Agreement between the Re-
public of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the 
Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference 
and Non-Intervention; 
Urge all States to act likewise. 
The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. 
Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original 
copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being 
equally authentic. 
For the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: 
For the Government of the 
United States of America: 
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BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN 
AND THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ON THE VOLUNTARY 
RETURN OF REFUGEES 
The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Paki-
stan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties, 
Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourli-
ness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace 
and security in the region, 
Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation consti-
tutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refu-
gees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascer-
tained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees 
are satisfactory to them, 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to 
return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the ar-
rangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement. 
ARTICLE II 
The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all 
necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the vol-
untary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland: 
(a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their 
homeland; 
(b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and free-
dom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan; 
(c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living 
conditions and to share in the welfare of the State; 
(d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal 
basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall 
be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on 
the basis of the Land and Water Reform; 
(e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, in-
cluding freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and re-
sponsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan 
without discrimination. 
The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to 
implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, 
all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation. 
ARTICLE III 
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facili-
tate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan 
refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, 




For the purpose of organising, coordinating and supervising the 
operations which should affect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful 
repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed com-
missions in accordance with the established international practice. 
For the performance of their functions the members of the commis-
sions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and 
have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High 
Contracting Parties. 
ARTICLE V 
With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the com-
missions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish nec-
essary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities 
for the phased return of refugees, including registration and com-
munication to the country of return of the names of refugees who 
express the wish to return. 
ARTICLE VI 
At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees will cooperate and provide 
assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in 
accordance with the present Agreement. Special agreements may 
be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Con-
tracting Parties. 
ARTICLE VII 
The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At 
that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be 
established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees 
under this Agreement shall commence. 
The arrangements · set out in Articles IV and V above shall 
remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period 
the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repa-
triation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that 
may be called for. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu, and Urdu 
languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any diver-
gence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail. 
Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of 
April 1988. 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Afghanistan: 
For the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 
AGREEMENT ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF 
THE SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN 
1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned 
and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settle-
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ment of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully 
brought to an end. 
2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement 
designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a 
framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the 
intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations 
held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Te-
heran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations contin-
ued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. 
The Personal Representative again visited the area for high level 
discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change 
the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity 
talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative 
were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to 
the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 
preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 
to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. 
The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area 
from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of nego-
tiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was 
suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 
August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 
November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the 
talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 
1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representa-
tive again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and 
the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The 
format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the 
instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accord-
ingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the 
negotiations throughout the diplomatic process. 
3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Gov-
ernment of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the nego-
tiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in ac-
cordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be 
based on the following principles of international law: 
The principle that States shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integri-
ty or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations; 
The principle that States shall settle their international disputes 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and 
security and justice are not endangered; 
The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic juris-
diction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
The duty to States to co-operate with one another in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations; 
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 
41 
The principle of sovereign equality of States; 
The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions. 
The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan 
refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimped-
ed manner. 
4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as com-
ponent parts of the political settlement: 
A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Rela-
tions, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; 
A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America; 
A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refu-
gees; 
The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settle-
ment of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan. 
5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Rela-
tions, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; the 
Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement 
on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement 
on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relat-
ing to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accord-
ance with the timeframe agreed upon between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a 
phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the 
date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops 
will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all 
troops will be completed within nine months. 
6. The interrelations:t?-ips in paragraph 5 above have been agreed 
upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political set-
tlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no inter-
ference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; 
the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary 
return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be complet-
ed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the volun-
tary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the for-
eign trops will start and be completed within the timeframe envis-
aged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obliga-
tions deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts 
of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required 
to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments 
be completed in good faith. 
7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mu-
tually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the im-
plementation of the instruments comprising the settlement repre-
sentatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and of the Islamic Repub-
lic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required. 
A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will 
assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. 
He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval 
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suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and com-
plete observance of the provisions of the instruments. 
In order to enable him to fulfill his tasks, the representative 
shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. 
On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the 
personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the 
provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For 
that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all 
the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom 
of movement within their respective territories required for effec-
tive investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to 
the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Par-
ties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted. 
The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the 
representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed 
upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Under-
standing which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement. 
8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the repre-
sentatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the 
States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provi-
sions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signa-
tures hereunder. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was 
present. 
Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five origi-
nal copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu lan-
guages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regard-
ing the interpretation the English text shall prevail. 
For the Government of the 
Republic of Afghanistan: 
For the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 
In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors 
affixed their signatures hereunder: 
For the Government of the For the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist United States of America: 
Republics: 
ANNEX 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
I. BASIC REQUIREMENTS 
(a) The Parties will provide full support and co-operation to the 
Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel 
assigned to assist him; 
(b) The Representative of the Secretary-General and his person-
nel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective 
assistance, including freedom of movement and communications, 
accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be 
necessary for the performance of their tasks. Afghanistan and 
Pakistan undertake to grant to the Representative and his staff all 
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the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Conven-
tion on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. . 
(c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of 
the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel 
while operating in their respective countries. 
(d) In performing their functions, the Representative of the Sec-
retary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. 
The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel 
must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Paki-
stan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for 
any of the Parties concerned. 
II. MANDATE 
The mandate for the implementation-assistance as derived from 
arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instru-
ments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully 
briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the 
procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof. 
III. MODUS OPERANDI AND PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION 
The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military Officer as 
Deputy to the Representative, who will be stationed in the area, as 
head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other 
in Islamabad, each comprising five military Officers, drawn from 
existing UN operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff. 
The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will 
act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Par-
ties through the Liaison Officer each Party will designate for this 
purpose. 
The two headquarters units will be organized into two Inspection 
Teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments 
comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the 
Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 ad-
ditional military Officers (some 10 additional Inspection Teams) 
will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest pos-
sible time (normally around 48 hours). 
The nationalities of all the Officers will be determined in consul-
tation with the Parties. 
Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-Gener-
al, who will periodically visit the area for consultatjons with the 
Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to 
the area members of his own office and other civilian personnel 
from the UN Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alter-
nate between the two headquarters units and · will remain at all 
times in close communication with him. 
IV. PROCEDURE 
(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties: 
(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instruments of the 
settlement lodged by any of the Parties should be submitted in 
writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters 
units and should indicate all relevant information and details. 
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(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy to the Representative 
of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other Party 
of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site 
inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure 
which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged 
violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters 
staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the 
Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In 
that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of move-
ment, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their 
respective territories. 
(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and 
submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General 
to the two Governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of 
the Report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential 
basis, to United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for 
the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.) 
In accordance with paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should 
be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours 
after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Sec-
retary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his 
good office(s) to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the 
organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the con-
text of those meetings, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-
General may submit to the Parties for their consideration and ap-
proval suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful 
and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. 
(Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of 
course, consulted with, and cleared by the Representative of the 
Secretary-General.) 
(b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General: 
In addition to inspections requested by the Parties, the Deputy 
Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own 
initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections 
he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of 
paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an 
inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used 
in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at 
the request of the Parties will be followed. 
Level of participation in meetings.-As indicated above, the 
Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at 
meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering re-
ports on violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the pur-
pose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such 
meetings. 
V . DURATION 
The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General and 
the other personnel will be established in the area not later than 
twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The ar-
rangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of 
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all timeframes envisaged for the implementation of the instru-
ments. 
VI. FINANCING 
The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the Par-
ties will be borne by the respective Governments. The salaries and 
travel expenses of the international personnel to and from the 
area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the 
headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations. 
U.S. STATEMENT 
The United States has agreed to act as a guarantor of the politi-
cal settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan, in ending 
the bloodshed in that unfortuante country, and in enabling mil-
lions of Afghan refugees to return to their homes. 
In agreeing to act as guarantor, the United States states the fol-
lowing: 
(1) The troop withdrawal obligations set out in paragraphs 5 and 
6 of the Instrument on Interrelationships are central to the entire 
settlement. Compliance with those obligations is essential to 
achievement of the settlement's purposes, namely, the ending of 
foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the restoration of the 
rights of the Afghan people through the exercise of self determina-
tion as called for by the United Nations Charter and the United 
Nations General Assembly resolutions on Afghanistan. 
(2) The obligations undertaken by the guarantors are symmetri-
cal. In this regard, the United States has advised the Soviet Union 
that the United States retains the right, consistent with its obliga-
tions as guarantor, to provide military assistance to parties in Af-
ghanistan. Should the Soviet Union exercise restraint in providing 
military assistance to parties in Afghanistan, the United States 
similarly will exercise restraint. 
(3) By acting as a guarantor of the settlement, the United States 
does not intend to imply in any respect recognition of the present 
regime in Kabul as the lawful government of Afghanistan. 
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